Q: Ambassador Johnson, I wonder if we could start by hearing a little bit about your background, your family, your education.

UAJ: Yes. I come from Kansas. My parents on both sides were entirely Swedish. My grandparents came from Sweden and settled in the farming community in Kansas, and my father had a country bank there. I worked in the wheat farms there in Kansas. We had a two-room schoolhouse, and I went--Elsie Rodine was my teacher for all eight years of my schooling there. There were three of us in my class: Elmer Lindquist, Milton Nelson, and myself. We went through the eight years of school together. Elsie gave us a pretty good foundation in the Three R's. I took the first year of high school there, and then we moved to California. I finished high school in California.

Q: Where in California did you--

UAJ: Southern California.

Q: Southern California?

UAJ: Yes, Glendale, a community between Pasadena and Los Angeles known as the "bedroom" of Los Angeles at the time. I graduated from high school there
and then I entered Occidental College in Eagle Rock, and graduated from there in 1931.

Q: What did you major in? What was your particular interest?

UAJ: I majored in economics at that time, yes. Then the Depression set in, and my idea of studying for the law obviously was not practical. I heard about these jobs in the Foreign Service.

Q: Oh, I was interested in how you--

UAJ: Well, I had a professor who said something about it, and I looked it up and discovered that they paid the fabulous salary of $2500 a year, which to me was fabulous at that time. So I came back here to Washington and took a year's graduate work here at Georgetown. It's a specialized course.

Q: Was that to prepare for Foreign Service?

UAJ: For the examination.

Q: Foreign Service examination?

UAJ: And then I took the examination and passed it in 1932, and immediately the Government stopped all appointments, including those to the Foreign Service. So I supported myself here for some three years working as a typist around Washington here in various companies. To my surprise, in 1935 I was working at Call Carl, the garage chain here. I became office manager there. As a matter of fact, when the NRA /National Recovery Act/ came along and I got raised from $60 a month to $70 a month, we got married on the strength of that at the time.

The Foreign Service I had almost forgotten about by that time. Three years had gone by, and I was thinking about preparing myself for something in
another area. One day a friend of mine called me up and said he had seen my name in the *New York Times* as being appointed to the Service.

Q: That's the first you knew?

UAJ: That's the first I knew about it, yes. In a little while my phone rang and it was Dr. Stanley Hornbeck on the phone. I was at the office, and he said he would like to see me. Would I be good enough to come in to see him.

Q: He took that personal an interest?

UAJ: Well, let me tell you though, yes. Would I come in to see him. Dr. Hornbeck was God as far as I was concerned. I knew the name well. I went down to see him and he said, Congratulations on my appointment, and would I be interested in studying Japanese or Chinese and see his recruiting officers.

I said, "Well, you know, I did pretty poorly on my French exam when I came in the Service. I'm really not a linguist, and I'm not sure that I want to do that."

"Oh, you won't have any problem with that," he said. "What would you be interested in?"

I said, "Well, I guess maybe if I was interested in anything, it'd probably be Japan."

"Well," he said, "go across the hall over there and see Bill Turner."

Bill Turner was a Japanese language student. Bill Turner asked me to say Sayonara, and I said, "Sayonara." And he asked me to say, I said, " and he said, "Oh, you're a natural for it."

So I reported back and I was signed up and I was appointed to the Service on Wednesday. On Friday we left for Japan to study Japanese.
Q: That quickly?

UAJ: Yes, in 1935.

Q: In 1935?

UAJ: Now I'll tell you, I might say that the bribe to study was that if I passed--it was a two-year course, all out in Japan. And if you passed your examination each year, you got an automatic promotion. We then started out as unclassified "C," was the lowest of low that there could be. You'd get an automatic promotion to a "B" and then you'd get an automatic promotion to an unclassified "A," if you successfully passed your exams. So that was the bribe, the basis on which I went to Japan to study Japanese.

Q: Well, I was wondering how you first got interested in Japan. When you took the exams back earlier in the thirties for the Foreign Service, were you already interested in Asia or was--

UAJ: Not particularly, no. I was interested in a job.

Q: In a job, right, the Depression years.

UAJ: $2500 a year and a job was what I was interested in. I'd had some contact. One of my best friends in college, a debate partner of mine, was a Japanese who went on in their service, also.

Q: In the Japanese Foreign Service?

UAJ: Yes.

Q: You said that Hornbeck was God to you. So you knew about him in 1935 when--

UAJ: Yes, I'd kept track of what was going on in the Department, of course, and tried to keep track of people. No, the name was well, well known.

Q: Well known in Washington.

UAJ: He was a well-known Washingtonian then, yes. So it's not a very romantic
story, but that's the way things happen in life. Most of my life has been a matter of chance.

Q: Did you read any books about Japan, or this happened very, very suddenly?
UAJ: This happened in a few days.

Q: In a few days. So you went without too many prior notions or impressions of what Japan would be like.

UAJ: I had nothing at all except through this Japanese friend of mine and living on the West Coast obviously, and in Los Angeles area. Japan and Japanese weren't entirely strange to me.

But then we took a ship over. Those were the days when we traveled like ladies and gentlemen rather than cattle. We took a ship over and were deposited on the docks in Yokohama, and somebody from the Embassy met us, took us up to a hotel, and said, "Here you are." Then we were on our own from there on, you know, trying to find a house and a place to live and doing all those things. They gave us a set of first-aid sentences, the Naganuma.

Q: You used the Naganuma readers, the early Naganuma readers?

UAJ: The Naganuma gave us a set of first-aid sentences to help us get around and find—to take taxis and to get around to find a house to live in and to do some shopping and so on. Japanese is not too hard to pronounce, of course, for a Westerner, and we could merrily use the sentences. The whole problem was when we used them, back would come a stream of something that was utterly unintelligible to us.

Q: I know the problem. Were you introduced soon to Ambassador Grew or any of the members of the Embassy Staff?
UAJ: Oh, yes, sure. Well, not right away. That was the largest State Department group that ever went out. We were 15, I think, in my class, the total Foreign Service class that came in. And there were some five out of that 15 that went to Japan and some three that went to China for language study. Among others that are still noted figures is John Emerson that was part of that group. John and I were in Georgetown here together doing our graduate work. Bill Yuni, Beppo Johanson. All of them have now left the Foreign Service and some of them have passed away, of course. But it was a large group, including my brother-in-law or the man that became my brother-in-law, Gerald Warner, who had been in the Service and also had volunteered for study. But he was not one of the new officers. He had already been in Foreign Service.

Q: Did you devote almost all of your time to language study the first two years?

UAJ: Completely so. We were supposed to. Tutors came to our house. We had the Naganuma readers.

Q: You worked individually?

UAJ: Oh, yes, we worked individually. And tutors came to our house and the Naganumasan would, about once a week or so, examine us. He was also teaching the military students. Among the military students who went out the same time I did was--he is now General Maxwell Taylor. He was then a captain. We lived very close together in Tokyo. And our lives became absorbed with studying the language, of course.

Q: And he too devoted his time almost exclusively to language?

UAJ: Entirely so.

Q: I would say he was probably our best student in the group.

Q: I wondered if I could ask you your first impressions of Japan, of Yokohama, Tokyo, of the Japanese people? Did you have much time, what with all this
UAJ: Well, we rented a house right in the middle of the Japanese community. It was a small western-style house that a Westerner had built, but it was right in the Japanese community in Tokyo. Our neighbors were all Japanese, and we lived for all practical purposes as Japanese except for the house, which was a western-style house. Of course, getting servants and dealing with them and shopping and getting around town and dealing with the local vendors and all that, of course, is the way you get pretty well immersed in the country and the language. We found people friendly, and we made some friends at that time that we still have. My impression was, oh, a--well, what we all know, an energetic people, the people that were ambitious, and a people that were not particularly friendly to foreigners or to strangers. There's a certain amount of xenophobia in Japan, particularly this was after, of course, Japan had taken over Manchuria in 1931, had left the League of Nations, and they were beginning to feel besieged. And that wartime atmosphere or besieged atmosphere that gradually developed and led on up to 1941 was in some ways beginning to show itself.

However, one thing that always impressed us was their friendliness to children. Our oldest girl then, I guess, was about three or four, very blonde. And whereas they could be very rude and very crude in public in many ways, when we'd get on a train or a bus or anything with little Judy and the place was ours.

Q: You were in Tokyo when the Young Officers' Rebellion occurred?

UAJ: Oh, yes, very much so, the February 26th incidents. Oh, yes, very much so.
Q: Were you caught in downtown Tokyo? Or you heard about it?

UAJ: Well, no, I woke up that morning, and it was a morning that there had been a heavy snowstorm during the night. And our neighborhood was somewhat eerily quiet. The trams weren't running, people weren't out on the streets, nothing was going on. I had no way of finding out really what was going on, didn't know what was going on. So I set off on foot to walk down to the Embassy. On the way I passed one house with a number of soldiers around it. I got to the Embassy and the front of it was blocked by troops, and so I got in the back way to find out what was going on. As you know, the Embassy Chancery there overlooked the Prime Minister's garden. So you could see the troops up there and the people around the Prime Minister's garden. Of course, by then, through the Embassy people, I found out what was going on. It was a very tense period.

Some of our students, two of them, were still living in the Hilsonya Hotel, which is still there as a matter of fact. It's a military billet these days, and that is the hotel that the rebels occupied as their headquarters. These fellow students of mine, when they came home late that evening, they found the place occupied by troops. But they were treated very courteously and permitted to go up to their rooms and get some of their clothes out. They were, of course, expelled from the hotel, and put up with some people in the Embassy.

No, it was a very tense period and I remember it very vividly. Everybody who was there remembers it vividly.
Q: During this period when you were doing the language study, did you also have to do a lot of reading in history of Japan or politics?

UAJ: Oh, yes, we had what you'd call now Area Studies. We read histories and, well, various books. We were studying Japan in depth.

Q: In depth?

UAJ: Yes.

Q: Was Stanley Hornbeck's book one of the books on your list?

UAJ: No, I don't recall that it was. Eugene Duman was, well, let's see—well, when we first went there, the chancellor, the Deputy Chief of the Mission, the chancellor at the Embassy was Edwin Neville, who was a very fine Japanese student. And he more or less supervised our work. Then he was replaced by Gene Duman, and Gene Duman also was a very fine Japanese student. So they kept a pretty close eye on us, but we were self-starters, I think. We didn't—but I mean they gave us a lot of help, a lot of help.

Q: You've mentioned Neville and Duman. I wondered if you have any impressions from those years about Neville and about Duman or Ambassador Grew.

UAJ: Oh, yes, I should mention Grew, of course. Of course, immediately on arrival we were introduced to the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew. I've always said that Ambassador Grew is my ideal of what an ambassador should look like and act like. He was a true, true patrician gentleman. And these were the days when—I think in 1935 we only had 12 or 15 ambassadors in the world. This was before we proliferated and prostituted the title as much as we have, and being an ambassador in those days was a very rare thing indeed. Grew was every inch the ambassador and I think well suited to
Japan because he had dignity, he had bearing, and the Japanese respected him. As you know, he stayed on until war attained. They didn't always like what he said, but they respected what he said.

Q: Were you aware as a language student of Division of Far Eastern Affairs politics back in the State Department, any tension between Grew and Hornbeck or Duman and Hornbeck?

UAJ: During the two years, this 1935 to 1937 period I was there, that had not developed to any degree. Really that developed after, well, the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the second Japanese invasion of China. That started while we were still there, but it was just in the process of starting. At the time of the Panay incident, we were all called back. Normally in the summertime we went up to mountain resorts or areas to do our studying, and we were all called back to assist in the decoding. These were the days when you coded and decoded entirely by hand, and sending coded telegrams was a very laborious process indeed. We were all called back to help because of the volume of work at that time. Then you had the—let's see, 1937—

Q: You were assigned to Seoul at some point in 1937?

UAJ: Well, yes, I was. The completion of our work was delayed until December of 1937 because of the work we had been called upon to do in the Embassy. We became somewhat familiar then, of course, with what was going on. In 1937 we all passed our final examinations, and I was assigned to Seoul as a vice consul. Seoul was then known, of course, as Keijo Tosen. I had a son who was born there. He has great difficulty in explaining his birth
certificate. On his birth certificate it shows Keijo Tosen, Japan. Nobody's ever heard of it before. It's an unknown name.

It was a two-man post at the time, but for a very considerable part of the period, I was alone and in charge of the post. And that was my introduction to consular work and the work of the Foreign Service, if you will. I had no training or background at all, of course. I had to do it by reading the book. Our regulations at that time were, I suppose, in a little book of about 150 or 200 pages, and we could look things up very rapidly and find out what to do. And there would be an oldtimer; one of the oldtime Koreans in the office would help you out in any event.

Our problem in Seoul was the problem of the relationships between the American missionaries and the Japanese Government Generals. Korea was probably the most intensely missionized area in the world. At the time I was there in 1937 even, there were, oh, as I recall it, around 600 or 700 missionaries. Most of the educational system of the country had been established by American missionaries, a good part of the medical system. There were large numbers of Korean Christians.

The conflict arose over the Japanese idea to denationalize the Koreans and make Japanese out of them. The Japanese Government Generals, which was always in the hands of the military there, went about this in a very hamhanded manner. The Koreans were strongly nationalistic and the handling of them by the Government Generals was very hamhanded. As a result there was a very strong resistance and a lot of friction between them, which found its focus in the whole question of attending shrines,
Japanese Shinto shrines. I use the word "attending" because I'm hesitation over the verb. The whole issue revolved around the verb. Were you going to pay obeisance at the shrine as the Japanese insisted, or were you being called upon to worship at the shrine, as the Korean Christians insisted, and therefore it was against their conscience, against bowing down towards other gods. And in this, of course, they found support from the missionaries. So the missionaries found themselves in hot water, of course, with the Japanese Administration, and in turn, one of my jobs was trying to keep them out of jail and keep things moving. So it was a very active post in that way.

Incidentally also, as a matter of curiosity, the biggest gold mine in the Far East was an American gold mine in North Korea up at Unsan, the Oriental Consolidated Gold Mining Company up there. This is up near the Yalu River.

The present-day Pyongyang, what's now Pyongyang, it was then called Haju under the Japanese. Haju was almost entirely a missionary town. You got off the train out of the station and you walked, going up the main street, and there were mission houses, mission schools, mission hospitals, mission canning factories, churches, of course. The whole town was very, very intensely missionized, particularly by Northern Presbyterians, who were very fundamentalist. And they and the Japanese found themselves very much at loggerheads with each other.

During this period, there was very considerable tension, of course, between the Japanese and ourselves--and myself even--because the
Government Generals, Japanese Government Generals, felt that Americans were complicating their problems with the Koreans and to a degree, of course, they were right. I was always under very heavy police surveillance at all times, and this is where I really began to feel, you might say, the pressure of the totalitarian regime.

I should say though, even in Japan, even before this—you asked about the atmosphere there—the police were very, very active and you had—well, every time we'd go any place, we'd always be followed by plainclothesmen. Wherever we went in town or any trips out of the country, we were continuously followed.

Q: Even as a language officer?

UAJ: Oh, yes, very much so.

Q: So all of the Embassy Staff then would have been very closely watched?

UAJ: Oh, yes, yes, very much so.

Q: The secretaries and the chancellor?

UAJ: Yes. However, I managed to travel considerably around Korea. I got up to the headwaters of the Yalu River, up White Mountain, another friend and I who spoke Korean. And we took a boat down the Yalu River, the whole way down to the Dam, which was then, of course, under construction, before the police finally caught up with us and got me out of the river and on the way back to Seoul. It was always a game between ourselves and the police, of course.

Q: You had then quite a busy routine. Did you do political and economic reporting, double in that sort of thing?
VAJ: Oh, yes. No, no, we did everything.

Q: Everything? Although you were called a vice consul, you were doing all kinds of things?

VAJ: Oh, no, the consular, no, no, no. The consular post in Japan, well, consular posts in China were—well, consular posts normally do political/economic reporting. That was the job. The idea that's somewhat developed now that consuls only issue visas and get people out of jail is, I wouldn't say less developed in recent times, but more division of labor, I suppose you might say. But even now though we expect our consular officers to do reporting. In Japan, well, jumping to the period when I was ambassador there, I looked to my consular posts very, very much for keeping their finger on the pulse, you might say, both economic and political, of what was going on in their areas. In every country that's true.

Q: Was the Japanese military presence very, very evident in Korea?

VAJ: Oh, yes, yes. No, there were several divisions stationed there. Let's see, 1937, the so-called "China Incident" then had started, so there were continuous troop movements through Korea. Of course, it's a channel for troop movements, and there were troop movements there and troop movements into Manchuria and so on. It was used very, very heavily. Of course, you had the railway from Pusan.

When the Japanese took Peking now, you could get on the train there at Pusan in the southern part of Korea and take the train all the way through to Peking. That rail line was very heavily used.

Q: Were you involved in military reporting as well? Or that would be part of your political reporting out of Korea?
Q: I noticed that you had a temporary assignment to Tientsin approximately July through November of 1939.

UAJ: Yes.

Q: Was that unusual, or you were relieving someone?

UAJ: No, it was unusual, very unusual. This was the period when the Japanese were having trouble with the British in the British concessions, and they blockaded the British concessions in Tientsin. Our office was also in the British concession there, and we had a number of Americans living there. We had a number of Americans in Tientsin in business, rug-weavers and so on. When the Japanese blockaded the British concession, they said that they did not want to interfere with American businesses. But very quickly Americans became involved, and I was sent to Tientsin as a Japanese speaker to deal with the Japanese military, you see, in Tientsin on behalf of the Americans there. This turned out to be a very tough and a very rough assignment because as tension mounted between the British and the Japanese, it also mounted with us.

And then in, I guess it was the latter part of July 1939, we had the biggest flood in the history of North China, in which Tientsin was completely inundated. The water remained there for almost a year after that. I mean, it didn't drain out at all. It's very, very flat, a flat area. Well, this became very, very difficult. We were completely flooded out of our offices, of course. We could only move around by boat, and we were short of food and
we had no water. The Chinese were seeking to come into the British concession or get food for the Chinese refugees from the countryside. And then the guerrillas started moving in, harrassing the Japanese on the outskirts. I in turn was trying to, you know, do something for Americans and keep ourselves going. It was during this period also, of course, that war in Europe started, but that was something we almost didn't pay any attention to at the time because we were so overwhelmed with our own problems there.

At that time I dealt with General Homa, who was commander of the forces in Tientsin and the North China area there around Tientsin. I got to know General Homa fairly well, and you may recall that he was hung after the war in the Philippines for the so-called "death march." I felt badly about that. Of all the Japanese Army officers I knew, he was the one that I felt was a genuine gentleman at heart, and I credited him with good motives.

Now what I did run into there first--this was my first dealings with the Japanese military. I was dealing with sentries and privates, and they could be very, very brutal to us, too. I had several narrow escapes during that period. But one thing I did run into for the first time there was the lack of discipline within the army. This theory that every Japanese Army officer felt himself the representative of the Emperor and entitled to have his own views on things which permeated so much of the military, I ran into there because Homa would--I would deal with Homa and I would get an answer from him, and he'd make some commitment to do something in so far as it was something to do with what I was seeking. I tended also to
become—the British and he had broken down their relations, and I was a go-between between the British and the Japanese military there also on many of these problems. He would make a commitment or promise something in that, and I'd go down to the checkpoint where the lieutenant was in charge and he would just ignore it, you know. He was in charge of the checkpoint. Homa could propose, would you say, but he disposed, I suppose is what we might say. No, I ran into this very, very much.

I also ran into the enormous brutality of the Japanese there towards the Chinese at that time. Of course, they were nervous and under tension.

Q: Did you have much dealing with the China Foreign Service officers in Peking?
UAJ: You mean the Japanese?
Q: The American China specialists in Peking. I was just wondering if you had any sense that—
UAJ: Oh, yes, some. Not too much. We were dealing with Tientsin problems. Tientsin was quite a center. We had a large office there. John Caldwell was the Consul General there at the time. Incidentally, I saw him last year out in Carmel. He's now 96—he has very fond memories—and still very vigorous. He was one of our great characters in the Foreign Service.

We had a large American community, active business there. There was very considerable trade. Hog bristles was a very important export and a very important one to us, too. I learned that there has really never been any substitute for hog bristles as far as paintbrushes are concerned. And we were beginning to build up stocks. It was a strategic commodity as far as we were concerned. Hog bristles, dried eggs; eggs were the big export
out of there. Rugs, carpets; we had several large American firms there manufacturing Chinese carpets. And we had all the shipping companies there, and we had a Marine detachment in Tientsin also. We all have stories about this, but they kept me alive during the flood period. They had their canned goods. They had a good supply of canned goods.

Q: The reason why I asked is that it was rather rare for China Foreign Service officers to have any period of service in Japan or vice versa. And you and Larry Salzer and Allison seemed to be exceptions.

UAJ: Yes. Well, this was not designed to give me experience in China. It was designed to exploit my supposed--

Q: Your Japan expertise?

UAJ: My supposed ability to speak Japanese. Yes, nobody else out there could do it.

Q: You were assigned then to Mukden in 1940?

UAJ: And then I went back to Korea for a while and then in 1940 I was assigned to Mukden, yes, and remained there until the war and was interned there during the war, the first part of the war.

Q: Did you make any special observations of Japanese economic penetration or development in Manchuria and North China in that period?

UAJ: Oh, yes, very much so. Of course, the South Manchurian Railway, you know the history of this, was a great industrial organization, and from the standpoint of the economy of Manchuria, undoubtedly did a great deal for Manchuria. It was a well-run organization. But then in 1931 when the Army took over in Manchuria, they sought to apply in Manchuria their theories, you might say, of economic organization, which were very naive, very confused,
and had a very considerable tinge of what you might call, what we call "socialism" about it. That is, back in Japan the Army extremists, which were always very divided from the rest of the country and the rest of the people very much and very insulated from the rest of the country, this was one thing, just to divert.—You know, a Japanese Army officer was taken when he was 15 or 16 and put in preparatory school and then went on up through military academy. And he led a life apart from the rest of the Japanese and his career was entirely apart. He wasn't paid very much. He was given a very chauvinistic training, and he looked with particular suspicion upon big business and big businessmen and the corruptions between business and the government. So when they took over Manchuria, they decided to run it as they thought it should be run. And this was sort of a mixture of state enterprise and some private enterprise, but under very strict state control, and running things with a very tight control, but not always very intelligent tight control.

So speaking of Manchuria and the economic development, I've often said the genius of the British as far as the colonizers was concerned, was in giving a very important stake to a significant element of the population in the British rule, that is, that they felt that it was important that the British system continue and you might say sharing the wealth, so to speak.

On the other hand, the Japanese—as a people I think to a degree, and then also particularly the Army—could not bear to see any Chinese develop at all. If a Chinese rice merchant would begin to make a little money,
they'd move in on him. If a Chinese store owner would start to build up a little bit, why they'd move in on him. And it's unquestionably true that they did a great deal in industrial development in Manchuria, but it's also equally true that there wasn't a single Chinese who had any interest or any stake in it in seeing them remain. This was one of their big failures as colonizers. This was also true in Korea as well. You could see it develop there.

Q: And you found this pattern among the Japanese businessmen and the Japanese military when they were in Korea or in Manchuria?

UAJ: When they were in Korea and then--yes, very much so.

Q: Were you acquainted with any of the big industrialists who came over to work with the military?

UAJ: Well, Aikawa, yes, we used to have Aikawa at the house now and then.

Q: Did he have any more sense about this than say the military or--

UAJ: Yes, he did, but he didn't—he wasn't running things. They were running things. I think he had some more sense about it, yes. He was more sophisticated in the economic field. As far as American business was concerned, what little we had left there by that time, they had put the squeeze on. We kept saying to them, you know, "That's a pretty stupid thing to do. After all, you say you want to maintain relations with us and you keep squeezing us out. You don't give us any interest in this either," which they didn't. So by 194—let's see, the National City Bank, I guess, was there. Yes. No, they'd gone. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banks were still there, and the Stanback oil companies had a little bit left, but they'd nationalized all that also. So we had very, very little
in the way of economic interests. We had these two posts, the post in Mukden and the post in Harbin, which were also two-man posts.

Q: Very small like Seoul?

UAJ: Yes. But Mukden tended to be the, well, I'd say the office that dealt primarily with the Central Japanese authorities in Sinkiang. You see, our status there was that still of consuls in Chinese territory. Of course, we never recognized Manchukuo. However, we would get a visa from the Manchukuo authorities, so-called, and they tolerated us. We had de facto relations with them and in fact quite extensive de facto relations.

There was a small group of, let us say, Chinese figureheads, beginning with Emperor Pu Yui at the top. And the mayor of Mukden would be a Chinese and the chief of police would be a Chinese nominally, but the Japanese were running everything. The Chinese had no real role at all. And the capital was at Sinkiang, and we dealt with the Japanese in Sinkiang and also Mukden as well.

Q: Were you in that period concerned with the possibility that the Japanese might move north or attack Russia? Was that part of your concerns?

UAJ: Very much so. Oh, yes, very much so. There was fighting up at previously and then there was fighting along the border. There was heavy. . . .

END SIDE I, BEGIN SIDE II
There were heavy troop movements through Mukden and wounded and dead coming back, the boxes of dead coming back, and obviously there was very considerable activity up there. And we watched this as closely as we could, just as a general observation.

However, we were also watching, of course, our own relations with Japan. And at the time the Japanese signed the Tripartite Pact in October or November of 1940, of course we then felt that meant eventual war between us. At that time we evacuated all our dependents, I recall, from China, most of them from China, and also from Japan. I took my wife and three children up to Chinguantao and had them rowed out to the Monterey and later sent back to the States, at that time. So we could feel the rise in tension and the tension was very, very strong. That was one place in my life I slept with a gun under my pillow at all times because some of the Japanese officers, some of the Japanese men, could be very irrational. Our British colleague next door had an officer bust in one night when he was in bed and unsheath his sword and said he was going to carve him up. The Britisher spoke perfect Japanese and managed to talk him out of it, but this was the kind of an atmosphere that we lived in. So, you know, it was a question of time, as far as we were concerned. We had no inside information, of course, communications. Our mail communications were months, of course, to Washington. Telegrams, of course, had to go through the Manchukuo telegraph office and be hand decoded, and we weren't kept informed particularly of what was going on. Our one lifeline was the courier about once a month who came through from Tokyo to Peking on that train. One of
my jobs was to go down at three o'clock in the morning and meet that train in mid-winter when it was 40 below, and it was a pretty tough job. But that was our one lifeline. That was cut in July of 1941 when we froze Japanese assets and in turn they froze ours, of course, including those of Manchuria, as well.

Our automatic reaction at the time was, "This means war." We just had no question about it at all.

Q: Just a matter of time?

UAJ: Just a matter of time. And we set up a system under which we would listen to this little short-wave station in San Francisco, KGEI. We'd listen to that until midnight. It went off the air at midnight our time out there. And then Dudley Tate, the British Consul, would start listening to BBC (British Broadcasting Company) at midnight. He would listen until dawn and we'd pick up on KGEI. We maintained a continual radio watch, you know, when it started.

Q: So you got American news out of San Francisco and European news from the BBC?

UAJ: That little news that we got that way. And so our word of the war came about four o'clock in the morning when Dudley Tate pounded up the stairs and said the war had started, the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor.

Q: I wondered how you heard about the attack.

UAJ: I knew he was crazy except for the fact war had come, but I knew he was crazy to say they'd bombed Pearl Harbor because having been shown around Pearl Harbor about a year before when I went through there on a trip, I was shown how impregnable it was and how impossible it would be for
anybody to attack it. But nevertheless it was clear that war had come.

Q: Did you have any sense in 1941 of the relationship between the Tokyo Embassy and the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and Hornbeck as political advisor to Hull?

UAJ: No. Out in Mukden we had none.

Q: None of that exchange?

UAJ: No sense of that at all.

Q: No sense of how the Embassy was doing its job?

UAJ: No, no.

Q: And whether or not it was heard in Washington?

UAJ: No, no. We were a long ways off then, three days by train from Tokyo. As I say, our only contact was three o'clock in the morning with the courier coming through.

Q: So then you were interned for how long by the Japanese?

UAJ: Until July of 1942 when we were brought over to Korea first and then over to Japan and held there on Kobe and then put on the Japanese ship, Itsama Maru.

Q: Were you repatriated with Grew and Dumon?

UAJ: Yes. Then we came out through Lourenco Marques, Mozambique.

Q: So then you arrived back in Washington at the Department in the late summer of 1942?

UAJ: Yes, 1942. It was October, I guess about—I forget the exact date. Yes, 1942.

Q: Could I ask you some questions about your impressions of the Department
of State when you returned in 1942? Did you find it much different from mid-thirties? Did you pick up much about again the politics of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs or Mr. Hornbeck's position?

UAJ: No, I would say virtually none. Remember I really didn't have any time in the thirties in the Department. I had three days, as I said, before I left for Japan. When I came back from internment, to my intense surprise, I was told to go out to California to see my family and they would get in touch with me about a new assignment. Of course, after one year of inactivity, I was all full of vim and vigor and ready to fight the Japanese, if you will. And to my intense astonishment, I was assigned to Brazil, Rio. I got a telegram on this, and I left from Los Angeles down to Rio without ever going back to the Department. I was told I was being sent to Rio in order to help look after the Japanese minority in Brazil.

I walked into Jeff Gaffrey's office—he was ambassador there at the time—and reported in and said I was here, sir. He harrumphed and asked me what I was supposed to do and I said, "Well, I don't know, but I was told that this was what I was supposed to do."

He said, "Oh, that's nonsense." Then he said, "Go down and see Walter Connolly." He was the economic consular. He said, "He's had four men working for him the last four months and he can't keep any of them. See if you can make him happy."

So I was introduced to bigtime economic work there in Rio. We were running the War Shipping Administration, the Rubber Development Corporation, the black list, this whole gamut of activity there. I was there for about
a year, a little over a year, and I returned to the States by military plane. My father died suddenly. They asked me to come back to Washington and asked me about accepting an assignment to work in the Army Civil Affairs schools training officers for Japanese service, which I accepted. I went to Chicago to a school there, and I lectured there, sort of as a half student, half on the military side, you might say, on the Japanese side working with the officers there as well as Northwestern and Stanford.

Then in the last part of 1944, they said they wanted me to go to Manila as soon as the Philippines were taken. So I went out with a couple of other officers; Paul Steindorf was in charge of us after we landed in Leyte. And we stayed there until we'd taken Manila. We went into Manila, and I worked there in helping to sort out the prisoners from the Los Banos and Santo Tomas camps.

Q: Could I backtrack just a little bit to your experience in Chicago? Were you briefed by the Department on postwar planning before you went to Chicago? Were you shown any planning papers, position papers?

UAJ: Oh, yes, a little bit and I kept in touch. Merle Benninghof was my contact at the time. And as far as postwar planning and thinking, I kept in touch with him.

Q: Did you give lectures on the emperor system or on the structure or system of the Japanese Government or economy?

UAJ: Oh, yes, sure. Well, not so much lectures as you might say seminars.

Q: Did any of those officers end up in occupied Japan?

UAJ: Oh, yes, they did. Yes, a number of them did. Of course never had--
of course, the one area in which we had military government we didn't prepare for at all, but that's another story that goes back to the war. That was Korea, of course. And of course no military government was ever established in Japan as such.

Interesting observation here. I found in this group of students--they were from both the Army and the Navy--two classes of officers. You had the young lieutenant/captain type fresh out of school, who was very interested in the whole problem though, the subject. Then you had the older, hardbitten Reserve colonel type, who thought it was all a lot of nonsense, the whole thing to do. Why leave any Japanese around to govern at all in any event? The only thing to do is to get rid of them, and they took a fairly jaundiced view towards the whole enterprise, even though as time went on a little less so. But the interesting thing to me, what I might say, is after we got to Japan, these older hardbitten officers, after a week or so there of exposure to some geisha girls and some of the Japanese and so on said, "Gee, you know, we really misunderstood these people." And they went completely overboard, I'd say, in their, in what I'd call, you know, emotional approach or sentimental approach to the problem. It was very interesting seeing how fast they would change when they got there, and I think the Japanese did a great job on them. I think a lot of them they "took them to town," so to speak, in many ways.

But back to the Philippines. You see, it was an Army responsibility, but the first day I was there I was standing in a mess line in Manila and there was a colonel behind me. He saw I was--well, I was wearing a uniform, but without any insignia. He asked me what I was, and I identified myself.
He was in charge of evacuating these camps, and he said he didn't know what in the hell to do. He had people who said they were Dutchmen and Frenchmen and Americans, and he had Filipinos. He didn't know who they were, he didn't know where to send them, he didn't know what to do with them. Could I come over and give him a hand? I said, sure, I'd come over and give him a hand. So I became involved in that up to my neck the whole time I was in the Philippines. And then when the surrender came, they asked me to go up with headquarters to Japan.

Q: Did you have any prior conceptions before you arrived in Japan of MacArthur from the Philippine experience?

UAJ: Oh, yes.

Q: Or any of the officers associated with him? Willoughby and others?

UAJ: Oh, no, no, no. I'd seen him a couple of times in the Philippines. Oh, yes. You weren't around that headquarters long without having an impression of MacArthur. He saw to that.

Q: Is it true that you're the first Foreign Service officer to arrive back in Japan after the surrender?

UAJ: Oh, yes, yes. I went with the first wave in

Q: In August?

UAJ: Oh, yes, yes. As a matter of fact, I got on the wrong plane in Okinawa and got back to the Philippines. I had to turn around again, so I was 24 hours late, but I was traveling on my own, you see. Well, my own, so to speak. Of course, there was a lot of confusion. But I got there the...
UAJ: I have absolutely no knowledge of any of that whatsoever. I was concerned entirely with Headquarters. I had no direct communications with the State Department or no reason to have them particularly at that time. The first thing that I know about a political advisor was one day Sutherland, who was Chief of Staff, called me and said, "The Old Man, MacArthur, is climbing the wall. He just received the news that Dean Acheson was coming out as political advisor." This was after a speech that Dean Acheson had made in San Francisco, I think, in which he had said something to the effect that the United States Government would be running the occupation.

And I said, "Oh, my, I'm surprised at that. You know, after all, the Secretary of State."

"Well, MacArthur's not going to have him." He wanted to be clear on that.

I said, "Well, let me see the dispatch. I haven't seen it." And the dispatch said "George Acheson." So I explained to him the difference between George Acheson and Dean Acheson. And in turn he went in to see the Old Man and mollified him that it wasn't Dean Acheson who was coming out to be his political advisor. That was my first exposure to that.

Q: To the problems between the State Department and him?

UAJ: You see, I went around to the prison camps, and I had a C47 and got around before any of the troops had come in. I made contact with our prison camps and assisted in seeing that our civilians—in getting them out to the ports where our task force would be coming in to pick them up.

Going back to Korea, before I left the Philippines, a day or two
before it was announced that we were going to occupy the southern part of Korea. I guess it was Sutherland, the Chief of Staff, got hold of me. He'd known I'd been in Korea. Well, he wanted to confirm that I had been to Korea and two, that in fact he said they had no instructions on Korea. And General Hodge, who was going to command the 24th Corps, was coming in there and he was in Manila. Would I see General Hodge?

So I saw Don. We spent all night together virtually, and I briefed him on Korea. People never heard of the place before, and I was appalled, as he was when we talked things through, that the orders for Korea were precisely the same as they were for Japan; that is, to keep existing officers on duty, you remember, and to treat Korea just the same as Japan was to be treated. Well, appreciating Korean attitudes towards the Japanese, I could see this was, you know, appalling. We went to see Sutherland and told him about this, and he said, "It's too late. These are all from Washington. These were the instructions." There were no special instructions at all. So poor Don Hodge was told to keep Japanese in office and all this, which immediately got us off on a bad foot in Korea. A lot of our troubles in Korea stemmed from getting off on that bad foot with no preparation being made for Korea, no training for Korea, no orders for Korea. It was an appalling state.

In any event, after dealing for about a week or so with prisoners, getting around Japan, they asked me to go over to Korea, which I did from Japan. I was there a couple of days after they landed at Inchon, and I spent a month there at that time until Merle Benninghof came as political
advisor. In the meanwhile in Japan, John Emerson had shown up, as I recall it. Well, some of the people assigned to the political advisor's office had shown up, and then I was over in Korea. But I had no direct relationship, I wasn't assigned to the political advisor's office at all. I was still assigned to Headquarters.

Q: Could I backtrack and ask you about your initial impressions of Yokohama and Tokyo when you arrived back just before the surrender ceremony?

UAJ: Well, it was, you know, it was one of those things it's hard to find words to describe it. The destruction was just so complete. I found great difficulty in getting around because I couldn't recognize places. I got a jeep before we'd occupied the place. I got a jeep and drove up, actually was driven up to Tokyo, and found our Embassy and found the Swiss in our Embassy and made contact with them there. And I will remember you could look across from our Embassy, clear across to the ridge on the other side where the Canadian Embassy was, with nothing standing in between hardly. And you could look down in the other direction towards St. Luke's Hospital with almost nothing standing in there. And between Yokohama and Tokyo, there was literally nothing standing. The destruction was just terrific. Of course, it was an eerie feeling. Everybody'd moved out. The eerie part of it was not only the destruction, but the fact that there was nobody to be seen in the streets. The Japanese, of course, had all fled the city, both Yokohama and Tokyo. Maybe there were a few, but very, very few people moving around Tokyo.

Q: When was the first chance that you had to speak to some Japanese people or to observe their morale?
While I was still in Yokohama after about three or four days—I was staying at the Grand Hotel, which was our headquarters—an MP came up to my room and said, "A Jap woman down here wants to see you." Well, I went down to the entrance and here was Yokosan, our old baby's maid, who had been with us in Japan and also been with us in Korea, as well, carrying a bag of apples. She had heard on the radio—she was up in the north, and she had heard on the radio, some Japanese radio, that I was with the occupation. I wasn't any big figure, of course, but she'd heard this, in any event. So she'd been living on this farm up there, and she'd gotten these apples together, had got a train down from north of Tokyo and had walked from Tokyo down to Yokohama through the MP's and Americans and all this, just to see me and, you know, in proper Japanese fashion, bring me these apples; you know, very, very touching. It took a lot of courage, a lot of courage. I might say that she never asked me for anything. Yokosan became the editor of, started a woman's magazine. She was quite a girl. She got the concessions in the PX's and she became quite a wealthy woman in the postwar occupation. Never at any time did she ever ask me for any help or anything. It was just a friendly gesture on her part.

There were a few Japanese I wanted to find, particularly the godmother of one of our sons who was born in Japan. I forget how I ran her down, but I found that she was in a commune and she was still alive. The story on this, I remember another Japanese gentleman I found who I ran into in the early days. I asked him about his family, and one son had been killed in the Philippines. He had a son in China that had not been heard from. His
His wife and daughter had both been burned to death in the bombing raid on Tokyo. By that time I was ready to crawl through the floor and sympathized with him. And I looked up and his eyes sort of looked up a little bit, and he said, "Those B20 and'--the Japanese--"BB2Q that bombed. Oh, weren't they magnificent, those B29's!" It's an attitude that we find it very hard to understand.

Q: I think that those first weeks were quite crucial, and I wondered if you had any sense that SCAP knew what it was doing or how we were settling in? And how the Japanese were going to react or interact with the Americans occupying the country?

UAJ: Well, I don't know. I somewhat instinctively sensed, I suppose you'd say, that when they surrendered, they would surrender completely. Well, I'd seen them in the Philippines, of course, when they surrendered. Then they would do an 180 degree turn, you know, and cooperate with us and the prisoners that were taken throughout the war. And I suppose I somewhat sensed this. I was saying I was going around to these prison camps. I would land at a Japanese airfield and be the first American in there, of course. And I'd get a car from them and go where I was going to go. When I got to Nagasaki, I had to land about 35 or 40 miles outside of Nagasaki. I got a Japanese naval car there, and as we drove in through that winding road to Nagasaki, the demobilized troops were walking on both sides of the road on the way out. They didn't have their arms, but their officers had their sidearms and swords still. Here I was all alone in this Japanese car in my American uniform, and all of a sudden it came to me, you know, what a crazy fool I am, if one of these guys should take off after me. But they never did. The only time
I ever had any flicker of doubt about it. Of course, my plane crew were petrified. But I sort of instinctively felt, I think, that when they surrendered, they'd surrender completely. And the first few days there indicated that. So I didn't at the time feel--it was quite evident, I'd say, to everybody that there was not going to be any problem with any, you know, armed resistance of any kind.

Q: How about cooperativeness in a more positive way with occupation policy insofar as the Japanese understood it?

UAJ: Well, in the early days the whole country did what their soldiers did when they surrendered. They turned 180 degrees. It was all cooperation. Nothing was too good. It was just complete flip-flop in the country as a whole. When the Emperor gave the word, that was it. As I say, I think our people tended to be somewhat naive, and I think the Japanese were a little more sophisticated, you might say, about many of these things than our people were. But outwardly, at least, there was full cooperation.

Q: Were you quickly informed about the contents of SWNCC 150, the initial post-defeat policy for Japan? I think it was made public about September 23rd or so.

UAJ: Yes, I think so.

Q: With policies on the Emperor or policies on zaibatsu purging?

UAJ: Oh, yes, I'm sure I was.

Q: Did you have any strong feelings about such things as political reform in Japan or say a new constitution or the proper use of the imperial institution, the economic-political purges, or zaibatsu and deconcentration? Was that part of your duties or responsibilities or thinking?
UAJ: Oh, no, no, no. They were not part of my responsibilities initially. You see, I spent that first 10 days or so in Japan, and then I went to Korea and was there for about 30 days. Then I was asked by the Department to come back and be Number Two in opening a consular office in Japan in Yokohama.

Q: A consular office?

UAJ: This went back to the first few days we were there. Right at the very first, I guess it was, Sutherland called me in and said, "The general would like to have a consular office opened in Japan."

I said to him, "I understand that the general's going to occupy the Embassy in Tokyo. The only place we could do it is this consular office down here in Yokohama." I said, "I was just over there this morning to see the Swiss, and the Swiss said that General Eichelberger had been there, and General Eichelberger was moving in at one o'clock that afternoon."

Sutherland picked up the phone and said, "Get the Headquarters MP's out there and don't let Eichelberger and the Eighth Army into the consulate." Even I couldn't get in after that, of course, but that was all right; I'd saved the building.

I don't know; there had been some communication, I guess, while I was over in Korea about opening--well, I think I'd communicated. I used Army channels, of course. I think probably I'd communicated this back to the Department. So to my utter surprise when I was over in Korea, I was assigned to open the--Bill Turner was assigned to open the office, and I was to be his Number Two in the consulate opening in Yokohama. I was
crushed. I was having a big time, young FSO /Foreign Service Officer/ floating around Headquarters and so on. But I did what I was told and went back and opened up the office, and I was Consul General there for four years. Bill Turner never showed up.

Q: What would be the duties of a consular official in Yokohama with Japan cut off from international contacts, international trade?

UAJ: It was just overwhelming. This was our biggest consular office in the world out here. Every young officer that came in the Service almost, who was Chief of Personnel and sent them out to me for training. I had a staff of about 15 or 20 officers there. First you had all the foreigners—well, others—that had some contact with the States, that were in Japan at the time of the surrender, wanting to get to the States. Next, you had about 15,000 to 20,000 nisei who had been in Japan during the war, who were wanting to go to the States as American citizens. Next, you had, well, in the beginning you had the travel of military personnel, births when dependents came in, births, deaths, marriages. All this had to be done through the consulate. We had a very, very active office.

As a matter of fact, later on when the so-called GI Bill on marriages set up for Germany—that is, that GI's marrying foreign girls in a certain period could take them to the States—some barracks lawyer in Tokyo discovered it about three weeks before it was due to expire. And I say I "married"—I worked out the process, the legal procedure under which people could get married in Japan. As far as they were concerned, the consul married them. We did give them a certificate. But we married some 800
couples there inside of about 10 days or two weeks. They were lined up out in the streets before six o'clock in the morning.

And then all the shipping. We had to deal with all the American merchant shipping, seamen's problems and all this. Of course, the consular flow on that was very heavy.

Q: You were dealing with very, very practical day-to-day problems. Did you have anything to do with implementation of SCAP economic policies, deconcentration, or reparations?

UAJ: No, not directly except for a brief period in which I--Beppo Johanson, who had been our executive officer in the office in Tokyo, passed away very suddenly, and I took over his job up there. I commuted back and forth between Yokohama and there.

You see, the Eighth Army's headquarters was in Yokohama, and I had a very close and very intimate and very friendly contact with the Eighth Army, which was charged with the responsibility for implementing a lot of these things, of course. They were running the Military Government teams and all this type of thing.

And then I went to Tokyo a lot. I was, you might say, on the social circuit of Tokyo, and I kept close contact with our political advisor's office up there. I was really the only, you might say, "independent" in Japan at the time. I had no responsibilities for these things. Theoretically I was not on his staff.

Q: That would make your observations of MacArthur, I think, in this early period even more interesting.
UAJ: I was a free agent, you might say, but also free in having no direct responsibility myself for implementation. So my opinions were formed upon the basis of, you know, conversations and observations, if you will. And I found I also had to establish branch offices down in Kobe and also down in Okinawa. I had to deal with the Bonin Islands.

Q: Did you get around more than a lot of the officers associated with SCAP and the sections there were in Tokyo?

UAJ: I don't know whether I did. A lot of them traveled, I think. I got around a great deal. I was able to travel very freely. The Eighth Army was always very helpful to me in giving me a railroad car or something.

Q: Did you have some sense over the four years of how the Japanese were responding to various occupation policies?

UAJ: Oh, yes. Yes, I think I did, yes. Then, of course, I had increasing contacts with Japanese, but I didn't seek them out particularly. I was frankly overwhelmed with just the day-to-day business of running and administering this office.

Q: Would you be willing to make some comments about General MacArthur, your observations or impressions of him in the early stages and perhaps a bit later in the occupation before you left?

UAJ: Well, it's nothing new for anybody to say that he was a complex character. You can use all the opprobrious adjectives in regard to him, and all of them would be true probably: vanity, self-assured. First, let me comment. The Headquarters--MacArthur and the immediate officers around him, Willoughby and the--well, Sutherland originally, Willoughby and Whitney
in particular, to a less degree Marquette was not quite the insider—that little coterie around him always felt themselves beleaguered and threatened, threatened particularly by Washington, threatened particularly by anybody from Washington, threatened even by their own commanders. Now Kruger and Eichelberger were the two big commanders out there during the war. They were never ever given any public recognition. They were a very, very closed corporation. In many ways the Nixon White House reminded me of MacArthur's headquarters, that sense of beleagueredness, and all the world an enemy, and you have to defend yourself against them. And under no circumstances could anything happen that will be any reflection on the General. So in that sense, it was a very uncomfortable atmosphere. And of course, the State Department first and above all, and anybody from the State Department.

George Acheson established a fairly tolerable relationship with them, and after George was killed, Bill Sebold, but only on the basis that it became very clear that the General was controlling them and they represented no threat to him. It took some time even to satisfy themselves of that. As a matter of fact, you know, they put them in offices clear across town from them to keep them well away from the central headquarters etcetera, etcetera.

Q: Were there policies that Washington wanted to enforce that MacArthur resisted? Did this ever create any problems?

UAJ: Well, let me go on with what I'm saying. Also to say that at the same time he was a genius, of course, and particularly a genius in handling the
Japanese. And I think that he was exactly suited to the times far better than anybody else could have possibly been. This aura with which he surrounded himself was not entirely artificial on his part, but he even increased it, of course, in his role as SCAP. The Japanese understood this. They responded to it, and I can't think of anybody who could come even close to him as far as being able to carry out that function.

As far as the individual is concerned, of course, he was a very eloquent person. Over the years we used to see Congressmen, newspaper editors, and other people who were not unsophisticated at all, in fact very sophisticated people, come out with very much of a chip on their shoulders as regards MacArthur. Most people did from the States, and he was very conscious of that, of course, too. He'd have them at lunch, only lunch was the only meal he ever did it. He'd have them to lunch up at the residence, and about three o'clock they'd all come out cooing. It was remarkable to see the way he could handle people.

Now as far as policies were concerned, I always had a feeling that his policies were a strange mixture. I had a feeling that there was in Headquarters—not naming names; I don't think I have to do that—there were a very considerable number of people whom you might call "social and economic planner" types. I don't say this in an opprobrious sense, but people who thought, given the chance to run things, they could run them a lot better. You might say somewhat the kind of people that were spawned by the New Deal, if you will, and that period in our history. I'm not saying this in an opprobrious sense at all. But I call them "experimenters,"
"social experimenters." Somehow they got into Headquarters, a very considerable element with this idealism but little regard for the practicalities.

So then you had such things as, of course, the famous Article Nine of the constitution, which is of course so naive and so unrealistic, but again idealistic. Article Nine stemmed from MacArthur himself without any question, although it was not entirely adverse to general Japanese emotion at the time. It was not the ideas of a more solid people. But in any event, you had on the one hand this extreme social, here is a test tube, here is a crucible that theories could be tried out in under ideal circumstances for a person of that--on the other hand you had the extreme conservatives of people, an element also in the Headquarters. And this extreme conservative element from this social experimentation and economic experimentation element were all these somewhat contending with each other, sometimes in the same person even. So anybody who had an idea. . . .

END TAPE I, BEGIN TAPE II

. . . had many very ill-considered things about that time and naive things. I think, you know, much of the so-called war criminal business, Tojo's war criminal trials--of course that didn't stem only from Headquarters; that stemmed from America, too--showed a very strong lack of understanding of how the Japanese system works. Tojo was not a dictator as Hitler or Mussolini were. You don't have that in Japanese history. Japanese prime ministers and Japanese leaders are chairmen of a board of directors, in
which they're just a little bit more equal than the others. But the whole system, as you well know, operates by the consensus, and you don't find dictators in that sense. This still continues to this present day. I always have a hard time making American presidents understand that the Japanese prime minister is not a president. He can't call the shots. I always have a hard time making American business presidents, the presidents of business companies, understand that the president of a Japanese business company just doesn't occupy the same position he does. He cannot give the Yes and No answers until he gets the consensus of his officers and so on. But in any event, this is going back.

I think much of the so-called war criminal lists, the education reform, I think, was badly conceived and entirely unnecessary going into the structure. The one thing that was pertinent at the time and that really had lasting effects, I think, was the land reform. Time now has passed that by, and it's now a handicap to Japanese agriculture. But for the period, it was needed badly, and it was well done, and of course--what's his name who was primarily responsible for--

Q: Do you think that zaibatsu busting, whatever it was, that we did in 1946/1947--

UAJ: Yes, I think that was naive also, and of course it didn't last six months.

Q: Were you at all involved in any of the efforts to reverse that policy of deconcentration?
Q: Just observing from the sidelines?
UAJ: I was observing from the sidelines and chatting with our own people there and with people around Headquarters, of course, too.

Q: Did this arouse a lot of passions though, those for it and those against it?
UAJ: No, I don't say that it did. People involved in it didn't know what they were doing, what it was about, of course. That was part of the problem.

Q: So it never went very far to begin with?
UAJ: It never went very far to begin with. The Japanese, in their own way, took care of it.

Q: You mentioned how good MacArthur was with the Americans who came over. Do you have any observations about his dealing with such Japanese as Yoshida himself or others, Shidehara, in the earlier period?
UAJ: Yes. I think he handled them well. I think MacArthur personally, there were very, very few Japanese that he--of course, he had virtually nothing to do with direct personal relations with the Japanese. Later on Yoshida used to see him, but he dealt primarily through the Chief of Staff or through the government section, through Whitney. I think Whitney was a bad influence on the occupation. Marquat I respected as a very able and a very sincere officer. He was above his depth somewhat. It was a big job for anybody, and he was not a part of the inner circle.

Q: Would you care to say in what way you thought Whitney was a bad influence on MacArthur?
UAJ: Well, I don't think I'll go beyond that.
Q: You had left Japan and returned to the State Department in 1949. I wonder if, at the time of your departure, there had been a great deal of rebuilding in Tokyo or Yokohama. Did you have any sense of what direction the Japanese would be moving?

UAJ: Oh, yes.

Q: Economically, politically?

UAJ: Yes. It was clear that they were getting back on their feet. It was clear in the first few weeks even. It was remarkable to see how people came back to their old homes, even though there was nothing there. Some flowers would begin to show and life was beginning to stir again. Of course, they were in desperately distressed circumstances, but you could see that the spirit was there. I did not foresee, I must say, in 1949 at the time I left, the explosion, you might say, of development that took place in Japan which, of course, really only started after the treaty. The treaty and the Korean War released their energies. They could have been released somewhat sooner than that, I think. I think MacArthur, there's credit to him on this. He was not seeking to perpetuate the occupation. The occupation went on too long as it was. But it could have been terminated, I think, much sooner with benefit to both sides. But nevertheless, we can't complain. It was a success. It worked out fairly well on both sides. Japan still had a very friendly feeling towards the United States, but the Japanese today are not hero worshippers of MacArthur. You can't expect them to be. After all, he was their conqueror who humiliated their emperor, too.
Q: So looking back on it from your vantage point in having served in the late sixties as ambassador, do you have a positive assessment of the occupation period?

UAJ: Oh, yes. I think the United States can be proud of it. It was unprecedented in all history as far as I know, and I think we have every right to be proud of it. And I think the Japanese feel that if they were going to be conquered, they were very fortunate in being conquered by the Americans. I think MacArthur was a great leader and fitted the need of the times very, very well. No, I wouldn't want to have to have anybody feel I had any different impression. You just see things that you think could have been done a little better is all.

Q: Before we entirely leave the subject of the occupation, I have just one other question in mind. You were very much involved in the routine of the consulate in Yokohama during those years. You said you increasingly dealt with Japanese. Could you reflect a little bit on your experience in dealing with the Japanese? Do you have any particular stories?

UAJ: Only to the degree that Japanese were beginning to travel, Japanese were beginning to come into the office. There were very few Japanese living in Yokohama. Yokohama was almost entirely occupied by the Eighth Army, so there were very, very few Japanese living down there. But the local governor and a few people of that kind we used to have more contact with. And then when they started to travel, we had more contact with them. But of course, the non-fraternization policy was still very much enforced, and I was sensitive to this and didn't want to flunk.
Q: Was it difficult for Americans to enjoy or to appreciate Japanese culture in that period, visiting temples or going to kabuki?

UAJ: Oh, it gradually became less so. No, they could do that and those that were interested could do that. But entertaining Japanese in your home was very much frowned upon.

Q: Did you ever manage to do that?

UAJ: Oh, yes, sure, I did some, but I didn't flaunt it. No, we maintained a tolerable relationship.

Q: You were brought back to the Department in 1949?

UAJ: In 1949, yes.

Q: As a routine reassignment?

UAJ: Yes. Well, I was brought back as Director of Japanese Northeast Asian Affairs, which was Japan and Korea. And my predecessor commiserated with me because, as he said, there was nothing to do in the job in the State Department. It was still occupied by SCAP. Both Korea and Japan were occupied. The military were running it, and the State Department had little to do with it. So he commiserated with me over coming into a non-job. However, it just so happened that in June of that year North Korea attacked South Korea, and I found myself up to my neck in active problems again and then, of course, the Japanese Peace Treaty was also completed in that period. During the period I was there, the relationship with both Japan and Korea was turned around, not due to me, but I mean, circumstances were turned around.

END OF INTERVIEW