Second Interview
Subject: Hilary Conroy
Place: University of Pennsylvania
Date: May 13, 1982
By: Marlene Mayo

HC: All right, we'll go ahead with tales of the occupation then. One of the first things I did when I got into Tokyo and got set up at the NYK Building is where we were billeted, Nippon Yusen Kaisha. I remember that drafty old place. They'd taken all the radiators out of it and they were on the street corner for scrap iron. Well, at first it was okay because it was early fall and no weather problems, but as we got into November and December, it began to get really cold in that place and we were assured that we would have "heat." Finally it did come in the form of little stoves, little I guess wood-and coal-burning stoves that were set up in each room. Four of us were billeted in a room, so we had a little stove in the middle of it which smoked quite a bit but wasn't too bad. But anyway, that's the NYK Building and I was going to say earlier than our stove problems I got settled in the building and got broken into my job, as it were, at the Chuo Denwa Kyoku, the Central Telephone Office, which was really almost an attached building to the Chuo Denshin Kyoku, which was the Telegraph Office. I mean, they connected, as I recall, by some kind of a tunnel at the rear. They were two separate buildings but they were very closely connected, and we were in charge of both of them.

Well, we got settled in there and into the routine but my budding young scholar spirit took hold quite early and I wanted to get a few historical records and check into things a little. I had a sense that this was a historic time. And one of the early visits I made was to the headquarters of what was
then called The Nippon Times, the English language newspaper in Tokyo. When I found out where they were located I went over and offered to buy back issues of the paper. I can't remember exactly when this was, probably in October approximately, and I tried to buy back all the issues I could get. I succeeded in getting them only back as far as September 1st. 1945, which was the first issue they came up with. They said that earlier issues had disappeared or were destroyed or something. I never did quite get the story of where they were, but anyway, I did get a good consecutive run of from September 1st. which portrayed the whole initial stage of the occupation before the censorship set in. Also as soon as I could I made a trip out to Tokyo University to see what was going on out there and I found a great big sign up, "Off Limits," So I didn't try at first to violate the Off Limits but later on I went out a week or so later and kidded around a little and was given permission to talk to anybody who was there.

And I made a few preliminary contacts that--I at least got a few names, as I recall, of professors and possible lines of communication for the future. I didn't really have time to press them at that point because I was more wide-eyed about the general adventure of just seeing things in the city of Tokyo and taking some of these weekend trips which we could take without any preliminary arrangements by train, getting on these cars that were available for occupation personnel.

Then other things I remember about the early fall and early winter was well, one thing was the so-called use of our mobile unit in our CCD /Civil Censorship Detachment/ unit, the telephone and telegraph censorship unit. Our mobile unit was in effect a great big truck with a whole lot of plug-in
apparatus for monitoring things. And we had this rather, for that era I guess, elaborate mobile electronic unit, and we were supposed to swoop down on other telephone offices and set up monitoring devices. I don't know yet quite what the theory behind it was. Maybe there were ways of circumventing the Central Telephone Office. We first used this in suburban Tokyo, as I recall in places like Yotsuya and then in Shohu and on down toward Yokohama and various other places. And the pattern was we would, without announcement, sail into one of these places with our mobile unit, go in and talk to the manager and inform him we were there and that we were authorized by SCAP /Supreme Commander Allied Powers/ or the Dai-Ichi Building where SCAP was located to monitor the operation for a few days. We would usually be met by cooperative people who would give us tea and show us the place and let us put things in order. After a few of these, I think the word got around that we were liable to come any time because the hospitality became almost excessive to the point at one place where they took us off to a special room and showed us that they had a ping-pong table set up for us. Apparently word had gotten around that some of us liked to play ping-pong a bit. There was a ping-pong table, incidentally, in the main building of the Chuo Denwa Kyoku which we discovered after being there a week or two, rather and that was our favorite recreation place. So it was/interesting and ironic I thought that at a certain point our sloop-in surprise attacks were greeted by such things as the availability of a ping-pong table for our use.

They also introduced us in some of these to certain Japanese beverages that I'd never tasted before. One of them was later known as that. I was given a big, tall glass of it at one of these introductory sessions at our sloop-in and I thought for a little while I was being poisoned. I just about gagged on it but I did the best I could with a few swallows and then I said I had to chuck something and I went out in the corridor and dumped it
down a drain, all but a little bit in the bottom. Then I came back and got through that without upsetting the equilibrium of the greeting party that had come.

As far as cooperation, in almost every sense we got almost embarrassingly good cooperation and sometimes—the only strange things in this were, I think, accidental, although a couple of times we were—we had our guard up a bit and we were a little suspicious like thinking we might be being poisoned by this white substance that we were drinking. But one time in our own headquarters building, we found that the floors had been oiled by a cleaning woman in such a way that they were so slippery that a couple of our messenger fellows, who were supposed to run messages from one corner of the building to another, actually slipped and skinned a few knees, and we were wondering if that was some kind of a secret plot to keep us a little less in connection with things in other parts of the building. But we interviewed the cleaning woman rather carefully and other people and we found that this was routine practice for keeping the dust down in that big, old building. And so we had to confess that there were no grounds for our suspicions.

As the days and weeks went on and particularly after the Army unit arrived, to take part of our duties, we really only had to put in half a day or so at the main headquarters. Of course when we went on our special mobile unit expeditions we might be gone for two or three days or whatever. In fact, some of us went to Osaka, too, for some mobile unit work down there. But in general we were by, I guess, January or so of 1946, really only working about half a day with our main work and we had more and more time to get acquainted around the country, which was certainly very good for exploring. I began to form certain impressions about the occupation. One was that it was becoming quite
pleasant. In the early days, I recall, for example, a lot of anger among some particularly of the—well, I think of this particularly associated with some of the drivers of some of the vehicles. I remember riding in a two-and-a-half ton truck with a veteran of Guadalcanal who literally prided himself on making Japs jump, as he called it. He was just driving that thing in such a way as to scare the wits out of anybody on the street and he I don't think would have minded hitting a few of them if they hadn't jumped, the way he was driving that thing. Well, I remember admonishing him a few times. He was one of the drivers for our unit and we got rid of him as fast as we could, but I did admonish him a few times about after all, the war was over and he shouldn't continue this sort of thing. I think quite early in the fall most of that type of person who had a lot of bitterness in him about the—understandably perhaps—about the experiences of the Pacific campaigns and the horrors of it—kind of were rotated back out of Japan. Anyway, there was much less of that by say January of 1946 and a feeling of, I think, not exactly friendly spirit but at least a certain amount of pity and even some admiration for the Japanese set in. The Japanese were struggling so hard to survive. Everywhere you'd go there were people with sacks going out to the country to get rice and bringing it back. And they were really working all over the place to reconstruct some kinds of shelter for winter and all of that sort of thing going on that you couldn't help but admire the pluckiness of the Japanese in doing this. And this carried over into the occupation and the occupation personnel began to, I think, react very favorably to the Japanese and try to, well, give them of course candy bars and stuff like that but some of the rations assigned to the occupation personnel I'm sure began to find their way to the Japanese. Of course this is a black market activity in a sense but also it was...
As I say, it was not that nasty. It was like trading a little C-ration for a souvenir and in fact the occupation became quite a souvenir hunt, I think, during 1946. The occupation personnel became fascinated with all these Japanese gewgaws that they discovered, everything from getta to these tabi and various kinds of kimonos for the girlfriends back home. All these things came to be very much sought after by occupation personnel and the Japanese were only too willing to part with them for certain more practical things like little food or something else that the occupation people might be able to trade and so there was quite an exchange going on here which, in many cases, ripened into at least semi-friendships among the occupation personnel. Of course part, a few of the occupation boys took up with Japanese girls and made a big romance of the whole thing. But even where that didn't occur, the general spirit of souvenirs and back-and-forth trading was pretty widespread or very widespread, I should say.

Also, the Japanese began to feel, I think, that the occupationers were not to be feared but were to be entertained a bit, and more and more you began to get invitations to Japanese homes. In those cases the Japanese would prepare a simple Japanese meal of some kind and the occupationers would bring in some American style food or Coca Cola or all kinds of things available to them, and it became a kind of potluck mixed affair and everybody enjoyed it. Also, the Japanese began to want to show you things about the country, tell you where the museums were, take you on expeditions to these places. I remember seeing the Kamakura Buddha and the Wano Park and a trip to Nikko, various places like that that I hadn't really known existed until I was told about them by emerging Japanese friends and led to them on weekend excursions or something of that sort.

Q: Were the Japanese developing again their own internal tourist business or were
you doing this pretty much on your own? I mean, the Japanese would tell you that these were interesting places and you would go or were there Japanese guides?

HC: They would go along with you but it wasn't a tourist business as such. It was just a kind of an ad hoc arrangement. Some Japanese you'd met would say, "Would you like to see Mt. Fuji?" and the next thing you'd know you'd be going to Mt. Fuji and the Japanese would be guiding you around. Sometimes you think of it as remuneration. What usually happened was the GI had some money and he would pay the cost of this and the Japanese would be serving as his guide. I suppose in some cases the Japanese would accept money directly but usually not, I think. They really tried to avoid that and if the GI paid him, it was only indirectly by, as it were, paying the bills for the trainfare or whatever was involved in going. So anyway, there was this great explore-Japan spirit that developed and the Americans began to, I think, enjoy the occupation by the early spring of 1946. The kind of early grimness of the fall and the not knowing what to expect had been dissipated in a kind of buoyancy about things that had developed.

Of course actually surviving that first winter was a big thing because it was a cold winter for everybody and the GI's as well as the Japanese, I think, sometimes wondered whether everybody was going to get through it or whether there would be some kind of big famine or real disaster. Also, there were all these rumors of earthquakes all the time in Japan and so on. We didn't know whether the whole darned place would fall down, but it didn't. In fact things began to be reviving by spring. Even the streetcars started running again. Of course these streetcars were kind of interesting. The electricity was a little wobbly and every once in a while on an upgrade the streetcar would come to a halt, whereupon all the passengers— they were always overloaded— would
alight and push it over the top of the hill which kind of was symbolic, I think, of the way Japan was going in those days. If the streetcar wouldn't get you up the hill, you'd get out and push it over and then ride down the other side and that sort of thing. Also, it's interesting to observe the way the Japanese officials cooperated with the American occupiers. For example, the traffic situation of course was mostly now GI truck and jeeps. There were a few very elderly Japanese vehicles to be seen on the streets, charcoal-burning, charcoal-converted cars of very ancient vintage but mostly it was GI trucks. Anyway, and the military police took over the direction of traffic at every major intersection there would be a big white podium with a beautifully dressed American military policeman directing traffic with gusto. But just behind him and slightly lower would be a Japanese policeman in a rather ragged, somewhat bedraggled uniform and he would literally make all the gestures a split second behind the American military policeman and do all the little things that would help keep the traffic moving without taking the initiative of being in charge. And I think that's symbolic of what happened in a great many offices in the Japanese government, that the Japanese in those offices waited to get the sense of what the American element which was in effect overseeing the offices wanted to be done and then real quick they would jump in to do it or to follow that lead. Of course at a certain point I think you might say some stonewalling developed, but in fact there was a lot of the more sensitive members of the occupation I think felt that at a certain point the business leaders were stonewalling on efforts to deconcentrate Japanese business and that sort of thing. But that didn't become apparent really in the first year. In fact, the year 1946 I'd say was very strongly the year of cooperation and going along with pretty much what the Americans were promoting and trying to do, even though the
reforms were pretty drastic. CI&E /Civil Information and Education Section/, for example, really did some very heavy overhauling of the educational structure and the Japanese without, I think, understanding very well for some of it, nevertheless went along. And of course places like Tokyo University, which had been purged of liberal faculty in the days before the war, those people began to come back. And we had the emergence, for example, of somebody like , who had been purged as a noncooperator with the nationalist goals and so on in the prewar period, are coming back not only as a professor but ultimately to become president of the university in a very important transition period in the postwar period.

When I went back to Japan in my Fulbright grant, I think that was in early 1954 I had a meeting with and he was then president of Tokyo University, and we had a very nice discussion about both the old days and the new days and how Japanese education, he felt, was going in a much more open direction and certainly it was and has.

Well, let me see, I don't know what else. Is there anything else you want to ask me?

Q: Oh, yes. I wondered if I could get just a little bit more of an idea of the nuts and bolts of your censorship job and the number of Navy men who were in your unit originally before the Army joined you, how functional your Japanese language, Navy Japanese language training was for the job that you were doing. Did you ever get any specific censorship training for this telephone and telegraph work? Did you listen in on conversations? How did you go about your job?

H: The first question, I think there were about, let's see, I'm trying to think how many language officers there were, probably about six or seven language officers in our original unit assigned to the Central Telephone Agency. Then there were a lot of technicians who handled all the wires and all that. I
don't know, probably 10 or a dozen of those. Then we had some Japanese personnel assigned to us from fairly early on, not immediately but when we got there we checked over the various people who were working on the jobs and a number of them were singled out as people who might be useful to our work and some kinds of I guess you'd call them "security checks" were made on these people. I don't think they were very thorough, to tell you the truth, but we never had any trouble or any sense of deception on the part of the Japanese who were admitted, as it were, to our inner office where all this monitoring was done. And those of us who were trained in the language, we spent a lot of time listening ourselves, partly to get acquainted with what was going on. But then sometimes we would put one of these Japanese to listening and then we would sort of interact back and forth to be sure we were getting the stories straight and so forth. Sometimes we would think we were hearing something that was sort of suspicious and then we weren't quite sure. We'd talk about what this terminology was with some of these people and so forth, even while a phone conversation was going on. I would listen, then I would get the native Japanese to listen. Then we would talk about what this might be and decide whether it was something worth writing down in a formal report. That was always the final question whether you'd write it down in a formal report, and I think in the early stages we wrote quite a few formal reports, some of which were probably overdone. We were expecting all kinds of trouble but as we went on into 1946 and particularly with these Army guys there, too, we were not as suspicious and we didn't, I think, have as many cases to report.

One of the frustrating things about the job though was that we were never told what happened to the reports we submitted. I mean, we were never told whether they followed through and found some shenanigans going on or whether
they didn't, and I don't know whether this is just a failure of communication at the higher level or whether this was deliberate. We used to kid about it because we were arguing it was a Navy unit, Navy Intelligence unit, that General /Douglas/ MacArthur didn't want to tell us any more than he had to, so he never reported back to us. We were always reporting to him, but he never reported back to us. We felt a little miffed at that, but at a certain point we gave up. We did a little trying to check ourselves as to what went on with some of these reports but at a certain point we kind of gave up and figured, "Well, we turned them in to headquarters. That's the best we could do."

The telegraph traffic was similar. We had whole piles of it we would go through. We learned to read it pretty well. It was really easier to handle than the phone because you had something right there, you know, you had a paper. It was mostly "Buji suitai arrived safely and everything's okay," people sending telegrams to their relatives about their whereabouts and so forth.

Q: Was this strictly domestic traffic?

HC: Well, we were soon getting, at least in the early fall, an awful lot of stuff involving Taiwan. I think in fact that most of the suspicious stuff we had were business transactions involving Taiwan. Some of them would get into what seemed like big money and so we were keeping an eye on that and reporting that pretty actively. Then I think too there was a lot of coming and going, not going but sort of coming back from Taiwan or people wanting to come back from Taiwan and when they would get back and that sort of thing. Also, I'm trying to recall if they had anything going from Korea. I think there was. There was traffic from Chosen, we called it of course in those days and the Japanese did, too, Chosen traffic. But most of it was of the order of people in families finding out where the other people were.
Q: Did you monitor sort of at random or were there specific individuals or families whose phones you tapped or kept close watch of?

HC: If we got a lead that something was worth reporting, then we would watch them particularly, but we also relied a lot on what you might call "random sampling," yes, just you know, moving from one thing to another and sort of seeing what was going on and kind of monitoring the tenor of the conversation. And if we got the impression that there was a lot of hostility in a certain set of conversation and so on, we'd report this. But it's interesting that there was more reporting of this in the early fall than there was as you get on into the spring of 1946 because the tenor/things changed very rapidly after the occupation settled in and the initial suspicions diminished.

Of course there were certain events that were very, I guess exciting and we'd get stuff on that. For example, when Konoe committed suicide in December, I think it was of 1945, there was a lot of watching on that sort of thing and we reported things about what we heard on the lines about that. Of course that was big national news in Japan. It was underplayed, I think, by the Japan Times in the sense that it was not reported in huge black headlines. It was just reported as a news story and in the other papers, too. But still, it was rather electrifying news to the Japanese public because he'd been such a prominent figure, three-term premier before the war, and furthermore, before his suicide, it had been widely rumored that he was going to come forward with a constitutional revision that would satisfy everybody and it would be a happy arrangement. And then suddenly SCAP announced that he was on the list for investigation as a war criminal and whoosh, a suicide, and then there was a kind of a turmoil on the lines for a while which we were actively monitoring.
Some other things: there was the, of course the Emperor's famous visit to MacArthur on New Year's, but that was all very positive and that really didn't call for much reporting. There were a few indications of sour grapes, that the Emperor shouldn't demean himself or something like that and that sort of thing we would at least write down, but most of it was so positive that it didn't require much comment.

Q: Were you asked to monitor something about the Emperor? Do you recall any special instructions on that? Did you have manuals or guidelines?

HC: We had a list of sensitive topics and the Emperor was one of them, yes, sensitive topics that we should keep an eye on. The Emperor was one of them and the military demobilization was another. Then when the war crimes trials started up, that was another that we were supposed to and did keep an eye on. It's surprising how little they were discussed though. They were going on in the old War Ministry Building and you could go over there--of course there were MP's guarding but Americans could walk right in and have a look at what was going on, and I did a few times. Then I'd go back to the phones, you know, and you wouldn't hear anything about it. It wasn't that it wasn't known that just it was going on but it seemed that people/didn't much want to talk about it, I guess at that point.

Q: What kinds of feelings did people express after Konoe's suicide? Was it just general anxiety or specific kinds of feelings?

HC: My recollection is that there was a lot of sort of, well, the Japanese expression; "shikata guni." I guess enters in here. "It's too bad, but there's no helping it. He had to sacrifice himself and--" There was surprisingly little, I think, saying that he deserved what he got as a former Fascist or anything like that. There was very little of that except in Yomiuri Shimbun, the newspaper that had
been taken over by the employees who were Communist-led. Oh, Tomin Suzuki, he's a guy that I wanted to mention. He was the Communist leader who was employed by Yomiuri Shimbun and he had taken over that or the employees had taken it over and shut out the owners. And they were commenting quite loudly and unfavorably on Japanese super-patriots and war criminals or war-criminal suspects. And you could almost count on Yomiuri for coming out with, "They deserved what they got" or "We ought to round up more of them" and that sort of thing. Oh, one of the interesting things some of us young occupationers with scholarly concerns did was we once arranged a debate, a group of us who had been watching the Japanese newspapers. Of course we were in tele-communications but we also watched the newspapers, too, and in fact we were in pretty close rapport with a lot of the fellows who worked at CI&E, Civil Information and Education, and also in the postal censorship people. We knew those people and we talked about things. Well anyway, we were all aware of what you might call the conservative versus the radical views of war criminal questions and so forth. Now the Nippon Times people made it come out pretty, well, with the Konoe thing and so forth, as if it were a tragic happening and so forth, didn't defend his policy or his prewar record or anything of that sort. But one got the impression.*sad* that it was a rather/thing whereas the Yomiuri crowd, "He got what he deserved" and so forth. Well, partly as the result of that and other things, in the early months of 1946 some of us thought it would be interesting to have a discussion about these matters. And we actually got both Tomin Suzuki of the Yomiuri Shimbun and Kozuo Kawai of the Nippon Times to participate and discuss the whole thing. We had a--I can't remember exactly where it was but we got a kind of a meeting hall and we had an open forum. A lot of people came. It was a very exciting kind of thing and the general argument was, presented by
Kawai was that the occupation was going very well and that the democratization of Japan was proceeding as it should and so on. And Tomin Suzuki took the view that not nearly enough war criminals had been ferreted out and not nearly enough breaking up of bad Japanese combinations and combine and organizations that had cruelly exploited the Japanese people in the past had been done. There was a big mixed audience of Americans and Japanese and it excited quite a bit of floor discussion and so forth. And that became a kind of a kickoff for a number of sessions like that which were arranged mainly by people connected with CCD and CI&E and other of these you might say some intellectual agencies of the occupation. So I think it could and should be said that at least some of the people in the occupation over there did more than just go to shows at the Ernie Pyle Theatre and run around to pleasure places. There was a lot of serious interaction and discussion about both the direction of the Japanese occupation as it was going and possible corrections or alternatives or different things like that.

Q: Did you have much traffic on the constitution about March of 1946?

HC: Yes, there was. I remember the whole business about the collapse of the Matsumoto Joji. That’s where I first learned about that, Matsumoto Joji’s committee had come forth with some kind of a proposal that was supposedly a happy compromise with the old and the new and then that fell apart and it was not acceptable to the occupation. And then Shidehara’s arrangements with MacArthur were reported in the press and there was commentary on it. We heard a lot of this talked about but there was nothing that would what you might call, that I recall, that was so derogatory about it that it would seem to be a plot against revising the constitution or anything like that. In fact in general, I think, by that time which was March and getting toward April of 1946, there was sort of an eagerness
of expectation about the new constitution, that it was going to be something
good and something that was better than what had been in the past. And by
that time the Konoe business, I think at the time of Konoe's suicide there was
some disappointment that the constitution problem wasn't solved by him and other
such great people. But that had been pretty well forgotten and it was generally
a kind of new era of feeling that the constitution was going to go forward, prob-
ably in a, you know, maybe better form than if the Matsumoto Commission had had
its way. So that kind of, I think, positivism was afoot.

Q: Did you hone in on those who had been purged just to see what they might be up to
in their forced retirement or hone in specifically on Communists and Socialists?

HC: Yes, in the course of our little series of discussions that went on with Kawai
and Suzuki debate sort of setting, quite a few names surfaced in terms of polit-
ical leadership and so forth. We tried to get some opinions from other
people who were mentioned. I remember going to interview Surumi Yuskai at
one point, a charming old gentleman who had a sort of a, well, slightly patern-
alistic—well, of course, those of us who interviewed him, I think there were
three or four of us from our unit went up and interviewed him. Incidentally,
these were things that were not really in our official line of duty. We just
as, I guess I could say, bright young intellects thought we ought to be doing
this kind of thing and also it was kind of fun, too, to go around interviewing
these people and not just sit there listening to these phones all the time.
So we sometimes would think up excuses, you know, to go out and interview
some—we're supposed to get a sense of what's going on. And so we'd listen to
the phone but then we'd go out and interview people, too, and stir up some of
these discussion groups and so forth. And it was not in our job description
really to do this but we just thought it was a way of becoming more sensitive
to the general climate of opinion. Anyway, we interviewed Surumi Yuskai and he was very paternalistic. We were, you know, all young fellows. Well, the commander of our unit was a man in his fifties, I guess, who had had a lot of experience with Western Union, as I recall, in this country but who knew no Japanese. So he was not really in on the--he didn't even go along to discuss anything. He was always busy in the inner office talking to GHQ or something. The oldest of the Japanese language officers I think was no more than 30 and most of us were in our mid-twenties or even early twenties. So we were just young fellows. And we'd go in to Surumi Yuskai, you know. He's an elderly politician from away back and he was quite paternalistic, trying to pat us on our heads and explain what Japan's all about and how we don't want to take this too seriously or that too seriously.

Q: What did he tell you Japan was all about?

HC: Well, he said that Japan needs good conservative leadership. That's essentially what he said. We'd been listening to Tomin Suzuki and some of that Yomiuri Shim bun stuff, so we argued with him a little bit, you know, how maybe they ought to have a few more labor unions and things like that. "Well," he'd say, "we'll have a few labor unions. But what we need is for the democratic forces--" of course they use the term "democratic forces" a lot--"to get in control of the government and get rid of those bad militarists but not upset the equilibrium of the economy and all that." And he warned us specifically about too much of this zaibatsu talk. There's not such a big zaibatsu as everybody thinks. The Pauley Commission had come out about this time and there were some loud discussion in the press about the Pauley Commission was recommending breaking up the zaibatsu. And Surumi and a couple of others we interviewed, who later it turned out were LDP /Liberal Democratic Party/ types, were in a low key urging us not to go too far with that sort of thing and I guess hoping that we'd get
it back to our superiors. And we had some interesting discussions with Surumi Yuskai and others of the emerging LDP leadership. We never did interview Yoshida. I would have liked to but Yoshida was—I don't know why—somehow it was a funny thing that Yoshida. . . .

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. . . Particularly inasmuch as I had the experience of living under Yoshida's premiership later when I had my Fulbright in 1953/1954. Yoshida was very much in evidence then. As I recall, that was the year that he tried to hit a reporter with his umbrella after an irritating interview. And in addition, I learned something about him that year. We took an old Buick to Japan with us which I tried to sell in Long Beach. I was only offered $250 and I decided it was better to take it with me to Japan where I might find some use for it and indeed I did. We had that old Buick over there during my Fulbright period and we were able to drive it around. There was a column that appeared in the Japan Times in those days by, I think, a man named Frew called "Motoring in Japan" and I decided to motor around all the places he talked about. We didn't do them all but we did some of them, and one of them was a trip to Kyoto, from Tokyo to Kyoto, the old in reverse, in our esteemed Buick. And we had a Japanese couple with us, Tom and Betty Shibara, Tokoa Shibara who later was on the Tokyo commission to improve the city. Remind me of the name of the mayor who was the son of the famous Tokyo professor who was purged by the militarists in 19--Inobe. Shibara was later Inobe's right-hand man for cleaning up Tokyo's environment. But anyway, Tom Shibara and his wife, Betty, accompanied us on this trip and it was a marvelous occasion because Tom was particularly observant about everything and able to explain a lot of things. We started out in my Buick and I am reminded of this by the Yoshida business. We started out
an amazingly beautiful highway in Tokyo south, and I remember remarking to Tom, "Why, I didn't realize the roads in Japan had improved so much. This is really great."

He said, "Well, don't become too enthusiastic because it may not last so long."

And I said, "Why not?"

And he said, "Because Premier Yoshida's villa is just ahead." And sure enough, we got to Premier Yoshida's villa, which was about 60 miles or so south of Tokyo, and that beautiful highway abruptly ended and we had nothing but flat tires and trouble on the road from that point on although we made it through Numazu. We stopped at Bentenjima. I remember spending a marvelous night there. We stopped at Nagoya and we drove up to Otsu and on to Kyoto. We also visited the battlefield at Sekigahara. Almost went in the ditch the road got so narrow at that point. Anyway, that's an interesting afterthought about Yoshida's highway system. It went as far as the villa and that's about all.

Q: When you were doing those interviews, did you ever speak to Takagi?

HC: No, but I met Takagi later at the East-West Center. He visited there some years later and I had a good chat with him about various matters and the constitution and things of that sort. And as I said, I also met Yanaihara at Tokyo University had a good discussion with him. That was in 1954. That discussion was a little peculiar though because we, well, that was the spring in which the U.S. was making hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific and the Lucky Dragon had just limped into port with all those well-contaminated fish on the Tokyo market and so on. And when I talked to Yanaihara I expected him to--in fact in my conversation I practically invited him to wax indignant over this U.S. mishandling of hydrogen bomb testing, to put it mildly. But although in
our conversation its interesting that he had been very strong and thorough in
denouncing the Japanese militarism, it didn't seem that he wanted to say any-
thing very critical of this, what to me was a very appalling example of U.S. . . .

END SIDE I, BEGIN SIDE II

. . . so at the end of the conversation with Yanaihara I was a little dis-
appointed. I had a feeling that he hadn't quite made the transition from the
evils of militarism in postwar Japan to the potential evils of militarism in
he postwar America. But of course was a very kind and gentle soul and probably
didn't want to embarrass me as an American.

You asked me if I also met Royama. I did indeed. I can't remember
for the first time had whether I met him during my stay during the occupation but I certainly/a number
of conversations with him on my Fulbright stay and I knew about his book, his
analysis of the situation in the Philippines and of course his involvement in
the founding of International House and some of those good things after the war.
I was quite impressed with many things he said. Of course also, as you probably
know, he was a very good friend of Matsumoto, the president of International
House. They used to be golfing companions and all that and I also met Matsumoto
in those days and had many conversations with him and with Royama and part of--

Q: You're alluding now to 1954?

HC: 1954, yes. Part of this turned up later in Matsumoto's book about the Shanghai
gidai. I felt privileged that I heard a lot of those things before they were
put in the book.

Another person who very much impressed me and influenced me in those days
was Professor Oka Yostakai of Tokyo University. Now I can't remember again
whether I met him in the occupation days. I probably did. I met a lot of them
without actually figuring out exactly who they were and what they were doing.
But when I came back on the Fulbright grant all these sort of shadowy personages that I had met very briefly in my exploits in Tokyo University during the occupation were really there, real people, and I knew or learned about the things they were writing and things they were talking about. Oka especially was very helpful in both urging me on or cheering me on in my study of what became the Japanese seizure of Korea or the Chosen Muni of the Meiji Period, as they always called it in Japan. Through him I met Sachari Yoshiyuki, who had had experience in Korea at Seoul and who was known as a Korea specialist and expert in Japan and who had some marvelous prints and photographs as well as a lot of written material and information about Korea which he made available to me. Also one of Oka Yostakai's students was Haggihara Nobitoshi who became, as it were, well, I think Oka sort of assigned him to me to follow me around and show me things and help me and this and that. Haggi and I became great friends and later Haggi followed me to America and lived at our house for a year while he traced the career of Bobatatsui which he first reported on in my seminar and which became the basis of his book on Bobatatsui. He tracked down Boba's grave in Philadelphia. I don't know if you knew Boba was buried here. Bobatatsui was probably our first Japanese student at the University of Pennsylvania. I've dug out the records that show that he was present. He didn't get a degree insofar as I can tell but he was certainly around here and he was--later on I was president, I became president of the Oriental Club of Philadelphia for a period in the sixties and I went through all their records. And lo and behold, Bobatatsui was listed as having attended the first meeting of the Oriental Club of Philadelphia back in about 1884 or somewhere around then when the club was being founded. So the Haggihara connection has been one that's gone on for many years, beginning back with the introduction from
Professor Oka.

Q: Could I ask you one or two more questions about that censorship activity.

Were the Japanese aware that you were doing this censorship in telecommunications?

HC: Yes, we made no secret of it. We couldn't make any secret of it because we were so obvious in our sort of trooping into the Chuo Denwa Kyokku every day and I'm sure that they all knew very well that we were "censoring." But in effect we weren't really censoring. We were just listening, I guess is really what it turned out to be.

Q: What was the condition of the equipment, the telephone equipment and telegraph equipment when you came in?

HC: Well, it was peculiar I think is the best word for that. We had a hard time figuring out exactly how it worked our rather our crew of technicians did. And the first time they got it hooked it up, they had sort of an elaborate switchboard. We would listen in and then if we didn't like what we were hearing, if we thought money was being transferred or something, we would pull a switch and break the connection and then we'd begin to write down frantically and trace who these people were and so forth. We found out after a week or so of feverish activity on this switchboard that when we clicked off that switch, we were just cutting ourselves out of the conversation but it went on down the hall through the regular switchboard. So that's when we started having runners to go down the hall and inform the operator that an illicit conversation was going on and that we wanted it stopped. And that's when we found out--that's when the innocent little old lady came in and oiled the floor and our runners began to take tailspins. So that was sort of chaotic. They certainly could not have failed to notice that we were monitoring things and very much into the inner workings. In fact, we would go down at certain points and order the switchboard
operator to pull the plug on a certain conversation while we made notes about it. Usually this would be in the case of preventing a monetary transaction of some size being made which seemed probably illicit or illegal or something of the sort.

Q: Did you at some point cut the Japanese off from overseas telecommunications, equipment calls to Korea or Taiwan?

HC: As I recall, after about January 1st of 1946 there was very little or practically no traffic on the Korea-Taiwan business. Now I do not recall getting a specific order about this but my presumption is that the phone structures in those places were taken over by either, I suppose, Americans in Korea and by the Chinese in Taiwan and that cut the connection so that we weren't in effect the final arbiter to those calls any more.

Q: Did MacArthur have his own phone connections with the United States?

HC: Well, after our— if you're asking whether we monitored General MacArthur's calls, no, we did not. I don't recall ever listening in on General MacArthur. But we were told that the phone line was open after we had tested it and I guess General MacArthur—

Q: That's interesting. You know something about the establishment of the trans-Pacific service. You said you tested lines.

HC: Yes, we tested these lines.

Q: What was that all about?

HC: Well, we were just told by the—technicians would come in and inform us that something should be in working order. There should be a line now open to San Francisco, for example, and we should test it out, see how it worked. And then we would go to it and we would all call members of our family or whoever we could get in touch with over there and test it out. And not only I did it
but other members of our unit did it, too. And then we would simply put in a report, "All Okay" and that's the last we would hear of it.

Q: In your opinion was the censorship pretty thorough, pretty stringent, during the time you were there? Was there a change in the pattern of the censorship while you were still there?

HC: I think the censorship probably seemed stringent, very stringent, in the early days of the occupation but it was partly because people were a little nervous and there was such a tremendous volume. For example, the telegraph traffic, it would just pile up on us to the point that, you know, we'd be a week behind going through it and that sort of thing, so that a telegram would be delayed, I'm sure, a week in delivery because we hadn't released it yet or something of that sort. And the post office, we weren't directly involved in the post office but I'm sure there were whole sacks of mail just waiting to be let go, just because of the lack of people to look at them. So in that sense there was a huge back log.

Then we became aware of this, well, increasingly ashamed, I guess you could say, of this kind of problem by the spring of 1946. We realized that there was very little, if anything, of significance in 98 percent of this stuff and we began to just stamp it "Okay" kind of willy-nilly to get it off the desk and get it out of the way and not again take it less seriously.

Q: Were there many tensions between the Army and the Navy after your Army censorship officers moved in?

HC: Not after we reached our compromise that, you know, we might as well both enjoy each other's company and not fight about it. There was tension for a week or so. Our commanding officer was very irritated by the whole thing, but then we realized that, you know, with a long-range eye to the future, it was probable
that we would get to go home sooner if—we were all incidentally classified as "essential personnel" to which the so-called "point system" did not apply.

There was a point system for release from military duty and this is one reason why all those tough guys who were so angry at the Japanese disappeared before Christmas in the first year of the occupation. They all had built up lots of points in Pacific War service and they were eligible for discharge and were sent home and were replaced by people who'd had less strenuous and less long service whose points were just building up. But in the case of the Japanese language officers, and this was true both of Army and Navy, the point system was suspended. So we had no—the points were not applying to us but still, it did seem logical that if there were two sets of us there, some of us would stay longer than others. Actually, as I recall, most of the Army people were still there when I left so I think the favoritism of the Army worked a little against them at that stage if they were trying to get home.

Incidentally, I should say also about our own assignments there, some of them were peculiar. Some of our Boulder people, who were of course trained as Japanese language officers, found themselves assigned to China ports, to China or to Korea. There were rumors at one point that two or three of us in the Tokyo unit were going to be sent to Seoul but that didn't materialize in my case anyway and I think—there were some of our unit assigned at Fukuoka and at Osaka. So there were other units like ours around Japan and we would all have a meeting every so often and sort of exchange views on what was going on in different areas and so forth. And pretty much it was a consensus, that is of increasing confidence that nothing horrible was happening.

Q: During this time then when you were preoccupied with the censorship duties but still could go around into the Japanese countryside and get to know something
about Japan. During this time what sense did you have of the overall purpose of the occupation?

HC: Well, I think we were all kind of excited by the idea or ideal of democratizing Japan. I know that we all assumed that Japan had been a pretty autocratic, authoritarian place run by small cliques of military and other elitist types. I had no sense at that time that it had been a Fascist system in the same sense or Nazi system as Hitler's and Mussolini's in the sense that the populace was involved in a mass party or anything. I think most of the occupation people I knew thought of the people of Japan as having been oppressed and misled by the military and perhaps including court elite and they needed to be liberated from these people. So in a sense we were democratizing the country.

Now there was some argument and some discussion about the different elements of democracy and among our young occupation people I remember discussing the extent to which there was political democracy, which we all assumed and accepted. But then there was this question of economic democracy, it was called, and that was tied up to the issue of the Soviet Union a little bit because some of our group were pretty anti-Soviet and they were concerned with political democracy and they assumed that when the old line parties were released from custody, as it were, of the military led by men like Surumi Yusaki and Yoshida, that Japan would be on the right path. But others argued that there was a factor of economic democracy. They loved the Pauley Commission Report which zeroed in on the zaibatsu as being heavily involved in the authoritarian structure of Japan and were cheering the trustbusting that went on and so forth. And I think that there was quite a bit of argument among leaders of the occupation, not leaders but the working elements as we were of the occupation on this. So that was a kind of an interesting thing.
In the general climate, one thing I might say was one very delightful thing that happened to me. I was sitting in Hibya Park one day eating a sandwich and a young man came up with all kinds of paints and things and asked if he could do my portrait. I said, "Why not?" So he did this marvelous portrait of me in which I looked slightly Japanese, but it's really quite a good likeness. We shared a sandwich and he gave me the thing and went on his way, an interesting intercultural exchange. And I suppose that ultimately the meaning of the occupation was a great deal of mutual appreciation of the culture of both the Japanese--they were eagerly copying us and at the same time we were very eagerly observing and trying to learn about and participate in some of their customs and ceremonies. So I suppose that was an even larger kind of result than the specific political and economic reform.

But in all I should say it was a very positive experience, not that one enjoyed every minute of it. There were a lot of discomforts to say the least, but it was certainly an exciting and a sense of an achieving time. And I think both the Japanese and the Americans involved had that feeling about it.

We thought General MacArthur--being a Navy man--was a little pompous.

Q: I was going to ask you that, what did you Navy men think of him.

HC: We used to snicker when he came strutting out of the Dai-Ichi Building. We'd go down and look at him every once in a while. "Let's take off work," we'd say "for an hour and go down and see the General." We'd walk down and see the General, you know, and shop on the way and then we'd salute as he came into the Dai-Ichi Building from his big car or went out of it and we'd have a little snicker. But you know, MacArthur was MacArthur and things were going so well we weren't going to criticize him that much. So I think that even among the Navy men, there was not any particular wish that Admiral Chester/ Nimitz had
been the commander in chief over there. MacArthur was keeping an eye on the Emperor and I guess that's all we expected him to do.

Q: Let me just, while we're here in this train station line, ask how you got released from your occupation duties since you weren't on the point system and whether you envisioned that you would go on in Japanese studies, Meiji studies, as you left Japan.

HC: On the first question I'm a little bit vague, although my recollection is that at a certain point they suddenly announced that the point system or a point system would apply to language officers if their superior officers said that they were agreeable to this. And at that point in time I was anxious to get back to Berkeley for that fall semester. We had these Army guys in the office and so I put in for release and it was okayed. The second point is about the going on in Asian studies, I didn't have an absolutely clear idea about it in my own head. I hadn't had time to think it all through, but my dear wife had been busy at the other end in California, had talked to several of my professors who told her that it would be very logical for me to go on in the Japanese history field or at least in Far Eastern History, which it was called in those days. They didn't make a differentiation. And in fact by the time I got back there there was a tentative arrangement made that if I wanted it, I could have a teaching fellowship to assist Professor Woodbridge Bingham in Asian History. He was just starting out a general course on Asian History. He of course was a China specialist but my being on the Japan side of things would help on that. So I sort of fell into that when I got back. Also Delmar Brown had arrived on the scene and George McCune was there. And they were both very attractive people to me and I fell into studying with them as well as with
Professor Bingham. And in that sense I was sort of swept up into the Asian History syndrome there at Berkeley. The only blot on the horizon was that I found that they had lost my German exam which I'd taken earlier, and even though I had Japanese now, they wouldn't forgive me from taking German. So that first year of 1946/1947 when I was back, I not only had to help construct this Asian History course but I also had to pass a German exam. I don't know quite how I did but I finally did.

After that things began to fall into line. I studied China with Bingham, Japan with Brown, and I became extremely fond of George McCune, who was teaching on Korea at that time but who was seriously ill. I didn't know about his illness at the time but it was in fact a terminal illness. But he was a very brave guy and even when he couldn't attend class he'd invite the students to come to his home and sit in a big chair and talk with us about Korea. And I think there was an emotional attachment to do something on the study of Korea that came out of that, especially after McCune passed away a year or so later.

That was delayed though. My doctoral dissertation was actually something suggested by Delmar Brown, a study of the Japanese in Hawaii. I was actually trying to get at the roots of the causes of Pearl Harbor and I didn't want to miss any big plan to seize Hawaii in the Meiji Period. Anyway, I got a Social Science Research Council grant to go out to Hawaii. I had the run of the Hawaiian Archives there in 1948/1949. There was a shipping strike on, which made Hawaii a rather quiet place at that time and I did the dissertation, then returned to Berkeley, got my degree, my doctorate, and found that Professor Bingham wanted to go on leave the following year. He invited me to teach his courses which got me teaching Asia, China and so forth. And the following year Delmar Brown wanted to go on leave and wanted me to teach his courses,
So I got the whole gamut and I almost thought of myself as a perennial substitute at Berkeley.

But then it must have been the spring of 1951 I encountered Roy Nichols sort of accidentally at a History Department function in Berkeley. We had a long talk and out of that came an invitation from the University of Pennsylvania to come back to Penn and start something in Far Eastern History here at Penn.

END OF INTERVIEW